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Abstract: The Vowel Agent Argumentation Architecture (V3A) is an abstract model by means of which an autonomous
agent argues with itself to manage its motivations and arbitrate its possible internal conflicts. We propose
an argumentation technique which specifies the internal dialectical process and a dialogue-game amongst
internal components which can dynamically join/leave the game, thus having the potential to support the
development of self-adaptive agents. We exemplify this dialectical representation of the V3A model with a
scenario, whereby components of the agent’s mind called facets can be automatically downloaded to argue an
agent’s motivation.
1 INTRODUCTION
Component-based engineering is a promising ap-
proach to develop adaptive systems. Adaptation is
obtained by replacing some components by others
or just by changing the connections between com-
ponents. This approach has already been adopted
to build agents (Ricordel and Demazeau, 2000;
Meurisse and Briot, 2001; Vercouter, 2004) to ease
the modification of the internal structure of an agent.
A current challenge is to automate this process in or-
der to provide self-adaptive agents. During this pro-
cess, the coherence of an assembly of components
must be warranted, i.e when the assembly is changed
(addition/removal of components and/or connections)
the result must be coherent. Solutions have been pro-
posed to deal with these issues but are not completely
satisfactory. The work of (Meurisse and Briot, 2001)
proposes to foresee all the possible assemblies and
seeks to describe what should be done in each case.
This approach reduces the openness of the system
only to foreseen situations. Other works rely on hu-
man intervention (Ricordel and Demazeau, 2000) or
they do not warranty the coherence of the resulting
behaviour (Vercouter, 2004).
In this paper we propose the Vowel Agent Argu-
mentation Architecture (V3A) to design self-adaptive
agents. Inspired by the Vowels approach (Demazeau,
1995), V3A is built upon an intentional stance. Addi-
tionally, V3A is divided in components called facets
encapsulating the different motivations of an agent.
We view these motivations as arguments describ-
ing the conditional decisions to achieve goals. A
facet can join the internal debate to argue for/against
the adoption of a motivation. Then, the personal-
ity arbitrates the possible conflicts. Regarding self-
adaptation, this personality corresponds to high-level
guidelines to solve conflicts appearing when modify-
ing the component assembly. The contribution of the
work is an abstract model of agency and the defini-
tion of a dialogue-game that can be played by facets
which can dynamically join or leave the game. For
this purpose, we consider an argumentation frame-
work (Dung, 1995) built to realize this internal di-
alectical process within this modular architecture. A
scenario illustrates the use of this mechanism.
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 intro-
duce the walk-through example to motivate our pro-
posal. Section 3 presents the V3A model, Section 4
presents the argumentation framework used to sup-
port it, and Section 5 describes the dialogue-game
facets play. We conclude in Section 6 where we also
present related work and we discuss our plans for the
future.
2 WALK-THROUGH EXAMPLE
We motivate our approach with the following sce-
nario. Max, who lives in Pisa, must reach London
for a meeting. Since he does not like to spend too
much time in queues in order to buy tickets, he has
a PDA equipped with a personal service agent (PSA)
in order to automatically buy a ticket when Max is in
a train station. The PSA has been set up by the con-
structor to respect the user’s preferences and to use
the computing system in order to assist the user.
Our starting point is the Vowels approach of multia-
gent oriented programming (Demazeau, 1995), which
has shown to be suited for developing agent platforms
e.g. see (Ricordel and Demazeau, 2000) and (Ver-
couter, 2004). In this approach a multiagent system
(MAS) is analysed across five dimensions: Users,
Agents, Environments, Interactions, and Organiza-
tions. The Vowels approach is generally used in the
analysis stage of the building process in order to di-
vide the problem according to these dimensions.
Users. Max has configured his PSA for this travel
and does not allow his PSA for paying extra commis-
sions since he will not be refunded for these. When
Max arrives in a railway station, the PSA automati-
cally downloads the four following components.
Agents. The PSA has a representation of the avail-
able seller agent (SA).
Environments. The PSA have the knowledge about
the current location, the current time, the possible
traffic troubles, and the train time schedule.
Interactions. The PSA has a representation of the
protocol required for communicating with the SA.
Organizations. The PSA has a representation of the
norms adopted by the system for the automatic pay-
ment.
In this way, when Max arrives in the railway station of
Pisa, the PSA is able to request a train ticket to reach
Pisa airport. Since the train is not fully booked the
SA sells one to the PSA and the payment is performed
within the computing system. Therefore, Max has a
reservation and can show its PDA to the controller
agent on board. When Max arrives in Stansted, the
PSA automatically replaces the four previous compo-
nents. Since the SA overcharges the train ticket price
with extra fees, the PSA does not register the user.
Therefore, Max will pay the train ticket on board to
the controller agent.
3 THE V3A MODEL
Our agent architecture (Fig. 1) consists of: a KBase
(KB) partitioned according to the vowel dimensions
(KBuser, KBagt, KBenv, KBint, KBorg), an Argu-
mentation State (AS) and a personality (pers). The
KBase is a repository of rules and assumptions pos-
sibly conflicting. The parameter related to a dimen-
sion can still be too large and needs to be decom-
posed in different facets (f1, . . . ,f7). We partition
further the dimensions linked to the external world
to distinguish perceptions and capabilities. For in-
stance, KBenv contains the representation of the phys-
ical laws in the environment (KBenv1 ) and the ob-
servations/actions perceived/performed by the body
(KBenv2 ). Similarly, KBint contains the protocols(KBint1 ) and the messages received/sent by the agent(KBint2 ). Facets joint (respectively leave) the game
for adding (respectively deleting) particular aspects of
the whole possible agenda of the agent, which taken
together will comprise every aspects that the agent
can address.
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Figure 1: The V3A agent architecture
The interaction between facets is organized as an
argumentation game, consisting of dialogical moves
about statements. The dialogue is regulated by pro-
cedural rules. AS is a shared memory structure. Its
current state includes a (partial) argument not yet de-
feated or subsumed. At the end of the game, AS con-
tains the action(s) to perform. That is, each facet
argues for or against motivations. The facet objec-
tives consist of promoting (or demoting) the goals
to reach, the actions to performed (or not) and the
beliefs to grant (or not) in order to actively achieve
some aspects of the agent’s agenda or avoid some
situations that would be detrimental. In addition,
facets monitor the statements proposed by other ones
in AS to determine whether these statements inter-
act with their own agenda. Essentially each facet
can have an opinion of what is best for the agent
as a whole, but from its limited viewpoint. A facet
must argue its case against/with other possibly com-
peting/completing views for this to become incorpo-
rated into the agent overt behavior. This behavior is
determined by the personality that specifies how to
give priority to the facets and arbitrate amongst them
to resolve the possible conflicts.
4 ARGUMENTATION
FRAMEWORK
Our argumentation framework (AF) is based on the
opposition calculus of (Dung, 1995), where argu-
ments are reasons which can be defeated by other ar-
guments.
Definition 1 (AF) An argumentation framework is a
pair AF = 〈A , defeats 〉 where A is a finite set of
arguments and defeats is a binary relation over
A . We say that an argument b defeats an argument a
if (b,a) ∈ defeats . Additionally, we say that a set
of arguments S defeats a if (b,a) ∈ defeats and
b ∈ S.
(Dung, 1995) analysis if a set of arguments is collec-
tively justified.
Definition 2 (Semantics) A set of arguments S ⊆ A
is:
• conflict-free if ∀a,b ∈ S it is not the case that a
defeats b;
• admissible if S is conflict-free and S defeats every
argument a which defeats some arguments in S.
Amongst the semantics proposed in (Dung, 1995), we
restrict ourself to the admissible one.
We use AF to model the reasoning within the V3A
agent architecture.
Definition 3 (KF) A knowledge representation
framework is a tuple KF= 〈L ,Asm, I ,T ,P〉 where:
• L is a formal language consisting of a finite set of
sentences, called the representation language;
• Asm is a set of atoms in L , called assumptions,
which are taken for granted;
• I is a binary relation over atoms in L , called the
incompatibility relation, which is asymmetric;
• T is a finite set of rules built upon L , called the
theory;
• P ⊆ T × T is a transitive, irreflexive and asym-
metric relation over T , called the priority rela-
tion.
L admits strong negation (classical negation) and
weak negation (negation as failure). A strong literal
is an atomic first-order formula, possible preceded by
strong negation ¬. A weak literal is a literal of the
form ∼ L, where L is strong.
We adopt an assumption-based argumentation ap-
proach (Dung et al., 2007) to reason about beliefs,
goals, decisions and priorities (Morge and Man-
carella, 2007). That is, agents can reason under
uncertainty. Actually, certain literals are assumable,
meaning that they can be assumed to hold in the
KB as long as there is no evidence to the contrary.
Decisions (e.g. request(psa,sa, ticket)) as well as
some beliefs (e.g. ∼ strike) are assumable literals.
The incompatibility relation captures conflicts.
We have L I ¬L, ¬L I L and L I ∼ L. It
is not the case that ∼ L I L. For instance,
paycom(psa,sa,price) I ¬paycom(psa,sa,price)
and ¬paycom(psa,sa,price) I
paycom(psa,sa,price) whatever the price is.
We say that two sets of sentences Φ1 and Φ2 are
incompatible (Φ1 I Φ2) iff there is at least one
sentence φ1 if Φ1 and one sentence φ2 in Φ2 such that
φ1 I φ2.
A theory is a collection of rules with priorities
over them.
Definition 4 (Theory) A theory T is an extended
logic program, i.e a finite set of rules s.t. R: L0 ←
L1, . . . ,L j,∼ L j+1, . . . ,∼ Ln with n≥ 0, each Li being
a strong literal in L . The literal L0, called head of
the rule (denoted head(R)), is a statement. The finite
set {L1, . . . ,∼ Ln}, called body of the rule, is denoted
body(R). R, called name of the rule, is an atom in L .
All variables occurring in a rule are implicitly uni-
versally quantified over the whole rule. A rule with
variables is a scheme standing for all its ground in-
stances.
For simplicity, we will assume that the names of rules
are neither in the bodies nor in the head of the rules
thus avoiding self-reference problems. We consider
the priority relation P on the rules in T , which is
transitive, irreflexive and asymmetric. R1PR2 can be
read “R1 has priority over R2”. There is no priority
between R1 and R2, either because R1 and R2 are ex
æquo, or because R1 and R2 are not comparable. For
instance, user(f 1,x1)Pagt(f 2,x2)) means that the
rules in KBuser have priority over the rules in KBagt.
The KBases and the personality of the PSA in Pisa
are depicted in Tab. 1.
Users KB. The user desires to reach the next travel
step without paying any extra commissions.
Agents KB. The PSA knows that the SA can deliver
tickets after requesting him. Contrary to Italy, utilis-
ing the services of a SA in UK requires to pay an extra
commission. The cost of tickets also depends on the
context.
Environments KB. These facets work on percepts
e.g. the time and the location of the PSA (cf
env(f4,a2)) and beliefs about the instant location,
e.g. the time schedule (cf env(f3,r1)).
Interactions KB. These facets also work on percepts
e.g. messages which will be received/sent and be-
liefs about protocols which depends on the context
e.g. int(f6,r1(aid1,aid2, ticket,price,comm)).
Organisations KB. The PSA must pay a ticket to
confirm its reservation.
Personality. Since the PSA has been set up by the
constructor to respect the user’s preferences and as-
sist him, the facets related to the user are preferred
than those that are related to other agents. In order
to utilise the computing system, the PSA prefers the
organisation facet rather the ones which are related to
the environment. Contrary to other components, the
personality is not embodied by facets but these pref-
erences are encoded in the procedural rules described
informally in Section 5.
In this scenario, self-adaptation is crucial since, when
Max is arriving in a new location, new KBases can be
downloaded and they replace the previous one. It is
worth noticing that the users KB and the personality
are not modified.
Due to the abductive nature of proactive agent reason-
ing, arguments are built by reasoning backward.
Definition 5 (Argument) An argument a for a state-
ment α ∈ L (denoted conc(a)) is a deduction of
that conclusion whose premise is a set of rules (de-
noted rules(a)) and assumptions (denoted asm(a))
of KF.
The top-level link of a (denoted ⊤(a)) is a rule s.t. its
head is conc(a).
The sentences of a (denoted sent(a)) is the set of
literals of L in the bodies/heads of the rules including
the assumptions of a.
In Pisa, the argument a concludes motive since the
PSA does not register. This argument is defined.t.
rules(a)={user(f1,r1),env(f3,r1),
env(f4,a1),env(f4,a2), env(f3,r3(lipifi))},
⊤(a) = user(f1,r1), and
asm(a) = {∼ strike,register(lipifi,no),
be(pisa,17)}.
By contrast, the argument b concludes motive if
the PSA request a ticket, pays it and registers. This
argument is defined s.t.
rules(b)={user(f1,r1),env(f3,r1),
env(f3,r2(lipifi)), org(f7,r1(lipifi, ticket,price,comm)),
agt(f2,r1(ticket)), int(f6,r1(sa,psa, ticket,price,comm))
}
⊤(b) = user(f1,r1), and
asm(b) = {∼ strike,be(pisa,17), pay(psa,sa,4,0),
request(psa,sa, ticket)}. After self-adaptation, similar
arguments exist in Stansted.
We define here the defeat relation. Firstly, we define
the attack relation to deal with conflicting arguments.
Definition 6 (Attacks) Let a and b be two argu-
ments. a attacks b iff sent(a) I sent(b).
This relation encompasses both the rebuttal attack due
to the incompatibility of conclusions, and the under-
mining attack, i.e. directed to a “subconclusion”.
The strength of arguments depends on the priority of
their sentences. In order to give a criterion that will
allow to prefer one argument over another, we con-
sider here the last link principle to promote high-level
goals.
Definition 7 (Strength) Let a and b be two argu-
ments. a is stronger than b (denoted prior(a,b)) if
it is the case that ⊤(a)P⊤(b).
The two previous relations can be combined.
Definition 8 (Defeats) Let a and b be two argu-
ments. a defeats b iff: i) a attacks b; ii) it is
not the case that prior(b,a).
In Pisa, {b} is in an admissible set since the organ-
isation has priority over the environment. This argu-
ment describes the motivation for registering. After
the self-adaptation of the PSA in London, even if a
new travel connection is considered, this argument is
no more admissible since an extra commission is re-
quired. Due to the agent personality, argument a is
reinstantiated and the PSA does not register.
5 DIALOGUE-GAME
The result of the debate amongst facets is an argument
sketched in AS. We consider here the procedural rules
which regulate the exchanges of moves to reach an
agreement. For this purpose, we instantiate a dialecti-
cal framework (Prakken, 2006).
Definition 9 (Dialectical framework) Let us
consider the topic, i.e. a statement in
L , and F C L a facet communication lan-
guage. The dialectical framework is a tuple
DF(topic,KF)=〈P,AS,ΩM,H,T,proto,Z〉
where:
• P= {p1, . . . ,pn} is a set of n players;
• AS= 〈Pro,Opp〉 is composed of two boards Pro
and Opp which contains the literals held by the
proponents and the opponents respectively;
• ΩM ⊆ F C L is a set of well-formed moves;
Table 1: The KBases of the PSA in Pisa
T Asm
KBuser user(f1,r1): motive← be(apisa,18) ¬pay(psa,aid,price,comm)
user(f1,r2): motive← be(london,22) with comm 6= 0
KBagt agt(f2,r1(ticket)): buy(psa,sa, ticket,4,0)← accept(psa,sa, ticket,4,0)
KBenv env(f3,r1): be(apisa,18)← be(pisa,17),∼ strike,take train(lipifi) register(train,no)
env(f3,r2(train)): take train(train)← register(train,yes)
env(f3,r3(train)): take train(train)← register(train,no)
∼ strike
be(pisa,17)
KBint request(psa,aid1, ticket)
int(f6,r1(aid1,aid2, ticket,price,comm)): accept(aid1,aid2, ticket,price,comm)← request(aid2,aid1, ticket)
int(f6,r2(aid1,aid2, ticket,price,comm)): ¬accept(aid1,aid2, ticket)← request(aid2,aid1, ticket)
KBorg org(f7,r1(train, ticket,price,comm)): register(train,yes)← buy(psa,sa, ticket,price,comm),
pay(psa,sa,price,comm)
org(f7,r2(train, ticket,price,comm)): ¬register(train,yes)←¬buy(psa,sa, ticket,price,comm) pay(psa,sa,price,comm)
org(f7,r3(train, ticket,price,comm)): ¬register(train,yes)← buy(psa,sa, ticket,price,comm),
¬pay(psa,sa,price,comm)
pers user(f 1,x1)Pagt(f 2,x2) int(f ,x), org(f ,x),
org(f 1,x1)Penv(f 2,x2) agt(f ,x), env(f ,x),
user(f ,x)
• H is a set of histories, the sequences of well-
formed moves s.t. the speaker of a move is de-
termined at each stage by the turn-taking function
T and the moves agree with the protocol proto;
• T: H→ P is the turn-taking function;
• proto: H×AS→ ΩM is the function determin-
ing the moves which are allowed to expand an his-
tory;
• Z is the set of dialogues, i.e. the terminal histo-
ries where the proponent (respectively opponent)
board is a set of assumable literals (respectively
empty).
In the V3A architecture, the DF allows multi-party di-
alogues amongst facets (the players) about motive
(the topic) within KF. Players claim literals during
dialogues. Each dialogue is a maximally long se-
quence of moves. We call line the sub-sequence of
moves where backtracking is ignored. Amongst play-
ers, the proponents argue for an initial claim while the
opponents argue against it.
We define here the syntax and the semantics of moves.
The syntax of moves is in conformance with a com-
mon facet communication language, F C L . A move
at time t: has an identifier, mvt ; is uttered by a speaker
(spt ∈ P); eventually rpt is the identifier of the mes-
sage to which mvt responds and the speech act is com-
posed of a locution loct and a content contentt . The
locutions are claim, concede, oppose, deny, and
unknown. The content is a set of atoms in L .
The semantics of speech acts is public since all play-
ers confer the same meaning to the moves. The se-
mantics is defined in terms of pre/post-conditions.
Definition 10 (Semantics of F C L) Le t be the time
of a history h in H (0≤ t < |h|). AS0 = 〈{topic}, /0〉.
The semantics of the utterance by the facet f at time t
is defined s.t.:
1. f may utter unknown( /0) and so ASt+1 = ASt;
2. considering L ∈ Prot ,
(a) f may utter claim(P), if ∃r ∈ Tf head(r) =
L, body(r) = P, P∩ Prot = /0, and it is not
the case that P I Prot . Therefore, ASt+1 =
〈Prot ∪P−{L},Oppt〉,
(b) f may utter concede({L}), if L ∈ Asmf.
Therefore, ASt+1 = ASt ,
(c) f may utter oppose({L′}), if L′ I L. Therefore,
ASt+1 = 〈Prot −{L},Oppt ∪{L′}〉;
3. considering L ∈ Oppt ,
(a) f may utter claim(P), if ∃r ∈ Tf head(r) =
L, body(r) = P and P∩Oppt = /0. Therefore,
ASt+1 = 〈Prot ,Oppt ∪P−{L}〉,
(b) f may utter deny({L′}), if L′ I L. Therefore,
ASt+1 = 〈Prot ∪{L′},Oppt −{L}〉.
The rules to update AS incorporates a filtering (in case
2a and 3a) to be more efficient. Concretely, the set of
literals in Pro and Opp are filtered, so they are not re-
peated more than once, and finally the literals in Pro
are not incompatible with each other. The speech act
unknown( /0) has no preconditions. Neither conces-
sions nor pleas of ignorance have effect on AS.
In order to be uttered, a move must be well-formed.
The initial moves are initial claims and pleas of igno-
rance: mv0 ∈ΩM iff loc(mv0) = claim or loc(mv0) =
unknown. The replying moves are well-formed iff
they refer to an earlier move: mv j ∈ ΩM iff rp j = mvi
with 0 ≤ i < j. Notice that backtracking is allowed.
Each dialogue is a sequence h = (mv0, . . . ,mv|h|−1)
with proto(h) = /0. In this way, the set Z of dialogues
is a set of maximally long histories, i.e. which cannot
be expanded even if backtracking is allowed.
The turn-taking function T determines the speaker
of each move. If h ∈ H, sp0 = pi and j − i =
|h|(mod n), then T (h) = p j.
The protocol (proto) consists of a set of sequence
rules (e.g. sr1, . . .sr4 represented in Tab. 2) spec-
ifying the legal replying moves. For example, sr1
specifies the legal moves replying to a previous claim
(claim(P)). The speech acts resist or surrender, i.e.
close the line. Players resist as much as possible.
The locutions concede and unknown are utilised to
manage the sequence of moves since they surren-
Table 2: Speech acts and the potential replies.
Speech acts Resisting Surrendering
sr1 claim(P) claim(P′), with r s.t concede({L}),
L = head(r) ∈ P and with L ∈ P
body(r) = P′
oppose({L′}), with unknown(P)
L′ I L and L ∈ P
sr2 oppose({L}) claim(P′), with r s.t. unknown(P)
L = head(r) and
body(r) = P′
deny({L′}),
with L′ I L
sr3 concede(P) /0 /0
sr4 unknown(P) /0 /0
der, and so close the line but not necessarily the dia-
logue (backtracking is allowed). By contrast, a claim
(claim(P′)) and an opposition (oppose({L′})) resist
to the previous claim. The moves replying to a deny
(deny({L′})) are the same as the replying move of a
claim (claim({L′})). At the end of the game, Pro
may contains the assumptions of an argument deduc-
ing motive.
6 CONCLUSIONS
We have proposed a dialectical argumentation frame-
work allowing an agent to argue with itself about its
motivations. The framework relies upon the admis-
sibility semantics and uses an assumption-based ar-
gumentation approach to support reasoning about the
knowledge, goals, and decisions held in the agent’s
mental facets. These modules interact via a dialogue-
game which is formally defined and exemplified via a
concrete scenario. The contribution of the work is a
modular model that allows the facets and the person-
ality of an agent to be specified declaratively, man-
ages potential conflicts and replaces components at
runtime, thus avoiding to restart the agent’s reason-
ing process whenever a component joins or leaves the
game.
Some of the concepts utilized here have been intro-
duced in the AAA model (Witkowski and Stathis,
2004). However, here we provide a formal defini-
tion of the argumentation game that the original AAA
model abstracted away from. We have also reinter-
preted the original model by using the Vowels ap-
proach, which has an agent-oriented software engi-
neering foundation.
Our work is also related to the KGP (Kakas et al.,
2004b) model of agency and in particular the mod-
elling of the personality of the agent (Kakas et al.,
2004a) through preferences. One important differ-
ence with (Kakas et al., 2004a) comes from our de-
composition which distinguishes explicitly the differ-
ent aspects, possibly conflicting, that the agent must
arbitrate. These aspects are embodied by faculties that
are more amenable to be plug-and-play components at
run-time using a multi-threaded implementation.
Future work includes investigating the properties
of different dialogue-games for different semantics
and properties. We also plan to extend the current
prototype using CaSAPI 1 to allow an internal dialec-
tic that is multi-threaded and relies on facets that are
interpreted by different proof systems implementing
different kinds of reasoning such as epistemic reason-
ing, practical reasoning and normative reasoning.
Acknowledgements. This work is supported by the
Sixth Framework IST 035200 ARGUGRID project.
REFERENCES
Demazeau, Y. (1995). From interactions to collective be-
haviour in agent-based systems. In Proc. of the First
European Conference on Cognitive Science, pages
117–132, Saint Malo.
Dung, P. M. (1995). On the acceptability of arguments and
its fundamental role in nonmonotonic reasoning, logic
programming and n-person games. Artificial Intelli-
gence, 77(2):321–357.
Dung, P. M., Mancarella, P., and Toni, F. (2007). Com-
puting ideal sceptical argumentation. Artificial In-
telligence, Special Issue on Argumentation, 171(10-
15):642–674.
Kakas, A. C., Mancarella, P., Sadri, F., Stathis, K., and Toni,
F. (2004a). Declarative agent control. In Leite, J. A.
and Torroni, P., editors, CLIMA V, volume 3487 of
LNCS, pages 96–110.
Kakas, A. C., Mancarella, P., Sadri, F., Stathis, K., and Toni,
F. (2004b). The KGP model of agency. In Proc. of
ECAI, pages 33–37.
Meurisse, T. and Briot, J.-P. (2001). Une approche a` base de
composants pour la conception d’agents. Technique et
Science Informatiques (TSI), 20(4).
Morge, M. and Mancarella, P. (2007). The hedgehog and
the fox. An argumentation-based decision support sys-
tem. In Proc. of ArgMAS, pages 55–68.
Prakken, H. (2006). Formal systems for persuasion dia-
logue. The Knowledge Engineering Review, 21:163–
188.
Ricordel, P.-M. and Demazeau, Y. (2000). From analysis to
deployment: A multi-agent platform survey. In Proc.
of ESAW, volume 1972/2000 of LNCS, pages 93–105,
Berlin, Germay. Springer Berlin / Heidelberg.
Vercouter, L. (2004). MAST: Un mode`le de composants
pour la conception de SMA. In Actes de JMAC’04,
Paris, France.
Witkowski, M. and Stathis, K. (2004). A dialectic archi-
tecture for computational autonomy. In Agents and
Computational Autonomy, pages 261–273. Springer
Berlin.
1http://www.doc.ic.ac.uk/∼dg00/casapi.html
